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Abstract – The decoy effect is a violation of rationality that occurs when the relative preference between two target 
options changes with the addition of a third option, called the decoy, that is no better than the target options but 
worse than one of the options on one attribute. The presence of the decoy increases the chance that the option that 
dominates it on this attribute is chosen over the other target option. The current study tested decoy effects with great 
apes’ food preferences. We presented apes with two target items, grape and banana, and a third item, the decoy, 
which was either a smaller grape or a smaller piece of banana. We found that apes’ decisions were not influenced by 
the presence of a decoy. In general, apes did not increase their choices in favor of the target item that dominated the 
decoy. This would indicate that great apes are not vulnerable to the cognitive biases that cause decoy effects in 
humans, at least in cases where choice is between two different types of food. We discuss what can be concluded 
about the psychological causes of human irrational choices and their evolutionary origin.  
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Utility theory predicts that preferences among different items are independent of external 
alternatives. In particular, the addition of an inferior option to a choice set should not increase the 
probability of selecting an option from the original set (c.f. the principle of regularity (Huber, Payne, & 
Puto, 1982; Luce, 1959)). However, humans constantly violate this assumption of rationality. A well-
known example of irrational bias in human choices is the decoy effect (Ariely & Wallsten, 1995; Huber et 
al., 1982). This occurs when the relative preference between two targets changes with the addition of a 
third target which is no better than the two target options, and objectively worse than one option on one 
attribute. For instance, imagine someone trying to decide between two smart-phones taking into account 
price and battery life. The choice-set is: 
 
Option A: expensive, long battery life 
Option B: affordable, short battery life 
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When presented with this choice-set, people will choose Option A with probability p and they 
would therefore choose Option B with probability 1-p. However, let the choice-set include a further 
option Option C, which is no better than Option A or Option B on either attribute but more expensive 
than Option A.  
 
Option C: very expensive, long battery life 
 
If the probability of choosing Option A in this new choice-set increases, then there is a decoy 
effect. Several explanations have been proposed to elucidate why decoys affect decision-making in 
humans. One prominent explanation is that the effect is driven by a need for justification while making 
choices. People would favor the item that dominates the decoy because it is easy to explain why this item 
is better (Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993; Simonson, 1989). Another 
explanation is that decoy effects are a consequence of loss aversion: the effect results from a change in the 
reference point of a prospect theory value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). That is, the presence of 
the decoy situates the reference point as having the decoy rather than as having nothing. Thus, having less 
of what the decoy provides induces an important loss of utility. Finally, decoys could result from a 
process of constructing preferences, in particular, from weighting the dimension made salient by the 
decoy more strongly than other dimensions (Ariely & Wallsten, 1995; Slovic, 1995). Making one 
dimension more relevant than the others facilitates selecting out one option: the decoy is strictly 
dominated on this dimension and should not be chosen. 
While the mechanisms underlying decoy effects are still under debate, the phenomenon has also 
been documented in a variety of decision-making tasks in humans (Slaughter, Kausel, & Quiñones, 2011; 
Trueblood, Brown, Heathcote, & Busemeyer, 2013; Zhen & Yu, 2016) and several nonhuman species 
including starlings (Bateson, 2002), honeybees and gray jays (Shafir, Waite, & Smith, 2002), túngara 
frogs (Lea & Ryan, 2015), and primates such as macaques and capuchin monkeys (Parrish, Afrifa, & 
Beran, 2018; Parrish, Evans, & Beran, 2015; but also see Cohen & Santos, 2017). Primate studies have 
used visual perceptual tasks in which subjects must distinguish between items of the same type varying in 
perceptual features, with conflicting findings (Cohen & Santos, 2017; Parrish et al., 2015). In these tasks, 
a monkey is presented with a pair of stimuli, for instance, two rectangular shapes of the same size varying 
in their orientation (vertical and horizontal). A decoy is introduced in the form of a smaller version of one 
of the two rectangles. If the decoy works, the rectangle matching the orientation of the decoy should 
increase its probability to be chosen in relation to a baseline condition with just two rectangles. In 
addition, a recent study used a representational task to investigate decoy effects on rhesus monkeys 
(Parrish et al., 2018). The researchers presented monkeys with two different icons referring to two 
different computerized tasks (a matching-to-sample task and a psychomotor cursor-tracking task) to 
assess which task they would select as a baseline preference. Then, they introduced the decoy versions for 
both tasks. These decoys took longer to complete but were otherwise identical to the original tasks. 
Although macaques learned to perform well in all four tasks, the decoy versions did not influence their 
selection rates of two original tasks in relation to their baseline preferences (e.g., they were not more 
likely to select the icon for the matching-to-sample task in comparison with the psychomotor task when 
the third option was the more time consuming decoy version of matching-to-sample task).  
The current study tests great apes (henceforth apes). It investigates preferences as revealed by 
free choices between food items: pieces of grapes, bananas and carrots. We use this methodology because 
we know apes have food preference and care about what type of food they can consume (Hanus & Call, 
2007; Hopper, Egelkamp, Fidino, & Ross, 2018; Sánchez-Amaro, Peretó, & Call, 2016). Our study aims 
to complement the mixed results obtained from previous studies (Cohen & Santos, 2017; Parrish et al., 
2015, 2018) and, more importantly, is designed to answer whether choice of preferred items rather than 
visual features (e.g., objects displayed in different orientations) would lead to a decoy effect. Indeed, 
evidence of decoy effects in humans cannot be explained by strictly perceptual processes only since, in 
experiments with humans, the choice-set is often presented verbally and can consist of options of varying 
personal preference among humans (Huber et al., 1982; Sedikides, Ariely, & Olsen, 1999; Simonson, 
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1989). This study with apes is also more comparable with previous preferential choice tasks with 
nonhumans (Bateson, 2002; Bateson, Healy, & Hurly, 2003; Schuck-Paim, Pompilio, & Kacelnik, 2004). 
Finally, the preferential choice task is a paradigm that has ecological validity, since primates’ choices of 
food in their everyday lives vary and is directly associated with fitness costs and benefits (Gilby & 
Wrangham, 2007; Janmaat, Polansky, Ban, & Boesch, 2014).  
We presented apes with binary and trinary choices using different food items to investigate 
whether they were susceptible to the decoy effect. In the first phase of the study, we established 
individual preferences by presenting a binary choice between items that varied in terms of quality and 
quantity. In the second phase, we presented apes with trinary choices to test the effect of different decoys. 
Additionally, we administered a trinary control to rule out the possibility that the change in the preferred 
items between binary and trinary choices was merely due to the increase in the number of options. We 
expected that apes would choose more often the option that dominated the decoy during test trials 
compared to binary and trinary controls. 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
   
We tested 32 apes housed at the WKPRC in Leipzig Zoo: 7 bonobos (5 females; Mage = 18.3 
years, SDage = 8.6 years); 14 chimpanzees (7 females; Mage = 27.4 years, SDage = 14.2 years); 3 gorillas (2 
females; Mage = 15.6, SDage = 2.9 years); 8 orangutans (5 females; Mage = 19.3 years, SDage = 9.7 years). 
Apes came from five social groups: one bonobo group, two chimpanzee groups, one gorilla group and one 
orangutan group. Groups were housed in indoor enclosures with access to outdoor areas. Apes were tested 
individually in their sleeping rooms. All individuals had access to water ad libitum and were never food 
deprived. Their diet consisted of regular mixtures of fruits, vegetables and animal protein. Their diet 
included the types of food we used in this study. Table 1 has information about the subjects.  
 
Materials 
 
We used a sliding platform attached to a Plexiglass panel installed on the front side of the apes’ 
enclosure (Figure 1). The platform could be slid forward towards the panel, which had three equidistant 
holes on its bottom part (one on each corner and a third one in the middle). There were three different 
food rewards: whole (B; 2-3 cm length and 2 cm diameter approximately) and half banana slices (b), 
whole grapes (G) and half grapes (g), and carrot slices (C; same size as B). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Representation of the setup. 
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Table 1 
 
Data Summary of the Most Important Conditions  
 
Name Species Sex Age  
Grapes/Bananas 
chosen in GBg 
trials (12 max) 
Grapes/Bananas 
chosen in GBb 
trials (12 max) 
Grapes/Bananas 
chosen in GB 
trials (12 max) 
Grapes/Bananas 
chosen in GBC 
trials (12 max) 
Fisher  
exact Test  
(GB vs 
GBC) 
Fimi Bonobo female 9 11/1 12/0 11/1 11 p > .05 
Gemena Bonobo female 12 12/0 11/1 9/3 12/0 p > .05 
Lexi Bonobo female 18 1/11 0/12 0/12 8/4 p = .001 
Luiza Bonobo female 13 12/0 11/1 9/3 12/0 p > .05 
Yasa Bonobo female 20 12/0 10/2 10/2 11/1 p > .05 
Joey Bonobo male 35 10/2 12/0 12/0 12/0 p > .05 
Kuno Bonobo male 21 12/0 11/1 12/0 12/0 p > .05 
Daza Chimpanzee female 32 10/1 9/2 8/4 8/3 p > .05 
Dorien Chimpanzee female 37 8/4 10/2 11/1 11/1 p > .05 
Fraukje Chimpanzee female 42 12/0 12/0 9/3 12/0 p > .05 
Frederike Chimpanzee female 44 8/2 8/3 7/5 11/1 p > .05 
Jeudi Chimpanzee female 52 4/2 7/2 5/7 7/5 p > .05 
Sandra Chimpanzee female 25 12/0 10/2 8/4 12/0 p > .05 
Tai Chimpanzee female 15 11/1 4/8 6/6 11/1 p > .05 
Alex Chimpanzee male 17 12/0 12/0 9/3 12/0 p > .05 
Bangolo Chimpanzee male 8 12/0 11/1 8/4 12/0 p > .05 
Frodo Chimpanzee male 24 11/0 11/1 8/4 12/0 p > .05 
Kofi Chimpanzee male 12 8/4 10/1 10/2 4/8 p = .03 
Lobo Chimpanzee male 14 10/2 7/5 11/1 10/2 p > .05 
Lome Chimpanzee male 16 11/1 8/4 6/6 7/5 p > .05 
Robert Chimpanzee male 42 7/5 6/6 11/1 12/0 p > .05 
Kibara Gorilla female 14 4/8 1/10 3/9 6/6 p > .05 
Kumili Gorilla female 14 1/11 1/11 1/11 4/8 p > .05 
Abeeko Gorilla male 19 3/9 0/10 0/12 4/8 p > .05 
Dokana Orangutan female 29 10/0 11/1 6/6 10/2 p > .05 
Padana Orangutan female 20 11/1 6/6 3/9 11/1 p = .003 
Pini Orangutan female 29 9/3 9/3 5/7 5/7 p > .05 
Raja Orangutan female 14 10/0 10/1 8/4 8/4 p > .05 
Tanah Orangutan female 8 7/1 9/3 11/1 7/4 p > .05 
Batak Orangutan male 8 5/3 6/5 6/6 8/3 p > .05 
Bimbo Orangutan male 37 7/0 12/0 7/5 12/0 p = .037 
Suaq Orangutan male 9 6/0 11/1 6/6 8/4 p > .05 
 
Note. Grey represent the 4 individuals that were excluded from the analysis. Yellow represents the 9 individuals with clear 
preferences for one of the two items. 
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Design and Procedure 
 
At the beginning of a session, the experimenter (E) sat in front of the platform. To start a trial, E 
retracted the platform and covered it with a plastic lid—preventing apes from seeing the platform’s 
surface. Depending on the condition, E baited the platform by placing the two or three food items in front 
of the holes on the panel. Once the food items were in place, E removed the lid and pushed the platform 
towards the panel. While pushing the platform, the experimenter had his eyes closed and his head oriented 
straight. We considered a choice when an ape touched a food item through the hole, pointed at it or put 
her mouth next to the hole. If apes chose two different food items simultaneously, E retracted the platform 
and repeated the procedure. After the ape obtained the selected item, E retracted the platform and 
prepared the next trial. 
Each ape received seven types of trials (see Table 2) across seven sessions. Each session included 
12 trials. E presented each type of trial in six different configurations—counterbalancing the locations of 
the food items. Every configuration was randomly presented twice across sessions. The first three 
sessions included baseline trials as well as control for decoy trials (3 types of trials within a session). The 
next three sessions included control for preference trials as well as decoy test trials (3 types of trial within 
a session). Either between the two sets of sessions (session 4) or at the end of the test (session 7), apes 
received one session consisting of 12 low value baseline trials.  
 
Table 2 
Summary of the Trials and its Rationale 
Types of trials Food options Rationale for the session 
Baseline BG Establishing baseline preference 
Low value baseline with strictly 
dominated option 
BGC Establishing baseline preference with three options. The carrot option is 
strictly dominated by the other two options. The idea is that Baseline and 
Baseline with strictly dominated option should not differ. See Table 2. 
Control for preference BGG or BBG Controlling for the reliability of the preference measure (i.e. whether the 
addition of the same item—not a decoy version of it—changes their 
decision. Not used in analysis. 
Control for decoy Bb Controlling that b is dominated by B 
Control for decoy Gg Controlling that g is dominated by G 
Test for decoy effect with b BGb Testing whether the presence of b increases the probability of choosing B 
Test for decoy effect with g BGg Testing whether the presence of g increases the probability of choosing G 
 
Analyses 
 
Before we analyzed the data, we assessed whether the choices expressed in the binary sessions 
revealed stable preferences by comparing how often a food item was chosen in the binary baseline (BG) 
with the low-value baseline (BGC). Fischer exact tests (see Table 1) revealed that 4 individuals 
significantly changed their preference during testing between the two equivalent conditions (since C does 
not qualify as a decoy). Hence, they were excluded from further analyses. 
We analyzed the data in two ways. First, we built two generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) 
(Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008) with binomial error structure to investigate whether apes chose B or 
G differently across conditions. Model 1 evaluated whether apes’ choices towards B—in comparison to 
all other possible choices—were significantly influenced by the condition. That is, between baseline 
preference trials (BG), test trials (BGb) and low value baseline trials (BGC). Model 2 used the same 
approach to investigate whether G was chosen differently between conditions. In a further post-hoc 
analysis, we analyzed whether those individuals (N = 19) with no statistically significant preference for 
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any item (i.e., when selecting either B or G less than 10 times in BG trials and less than eight times in 
BGC trials) were still affected by decoys.  
Second, in a post-hoc analysis we calculated whether apes’ choices significantly deviated 
between decoy test trials (BGb and BGg) and BGC trials as a function of the decoy presented. To do so, 
we calculated a preference ratio  for every subject for BGb, BGg and BGC trials. Next, we compared 
the ratios obtained from BGb and BGg trials to those obtained from BGC trials. In contrast to the 
GLMMs, these ratio calculations disregarded the number of times b or g were preferred and allowed us to 
directly compare the relative preference for the target items. Furthermore, these analyses allowed us to 
single out the response of each individual while downplaying the contribution of potential outliers (i.e., 
apes that showed different preferences between the binary baseline and the low-value baseline). 
 
Results 
 
Apes preferred grapes over bananas in most choices (61% in BG trials, 70% in BGb trials, 73% in 
BGg trials and 79% in BGC trials; N = 28). See details in Table 1. The GLMMs did not document a decoy 
effect. We found no significant differences in the proportion of times apes chose B across BG, BGb and 
BGC conditions (GLMM:  c2   = 2.6, df = 2, p = .27, N = 1,008). Additionally, we found no significant 
differences in the proportion of times that apes chose G across BG, BGg and BGC conditions (GLMM:  c2   
=1.8, df = 2, p = .40, N =1,008). See the Appendix for model details. Furthermore, in a post-hoc analysis 
we inspected whether individuals with no statistically significant preference (N = 19) were affected by 
decoys. As in our previous analysis, we found no significant differences in the proportion of times apes 
chose B or G across test and baseline conditions (see Appendix for model results). The results of the 
above analyses were likely determined by a few individuals whose choices were going contrary to the 
prediction of a decoy effect—they chose G more often when the decoy b was present. We therefore 
decided to run a post hoc analysis that takes each subjects’ sensitivity to the decoy option as the element 
of statistical analysis, while the above models pooled together all subjects’ choices. 
For each subject, we calculated the ‘relative preference for B over G’ (i.e., ). We then 
compared the relative preferences in the baseline session BGC and in the decoy trials BGb and BGg. A 
significant increase in the number of choices of B in the b decoy trials could be interpreted as 
documenting a decoy effect, and so would a significant increase in the number of choices of G in the g 
decoy trials. 
The mean value of  was higher in BGb compared to BGC (BGb M = 0.27, SD = 0.29; BGC M 
= .19, SD = 0.22), but this difference was not significant (t(27) = 1.77; p = .09). Apes did not choose B 
more often in BGC compared to BGg (BGC M = 0.19, SD = 0.22; BGg M = 0.17, SD = 0.25) (t(27) = 
0.63; p = .53). Given these results, we cannot conclude that the apes’ decisions were affected by decoys.  
 
Discussion 
 
We found no compelling evidence that apes were susceptible to decoy effects when presented 
with different food choices varying in quantity and quality. Although including b as a choice slightly 
enhanced the preference for B over G, these differences were not statistically significant. 
The two most probable explanations for the results are (a) that nonhuman apes are not sensitive to 
decoy options when choosing their preferred item from a set of options, and (b) that there is a sensitivity 
to decoy, which we failed to measure because preferences among food items can vary importantly across 
individuals and also across time within subjects. Our second statistical analysis controls for the individual 
variation since it excluded four individuals that varied their choices (and presumably their preference) 
over time. Still, seven individuals varied their choices substantially between BG and BGC trials. 
Relatedly, we found that only nine of 28 apes showed a clear preference for one of the items (21% of 
chimpanzees, no orangutans, 66% of gorillas and 57% of bonobos). One possible solution to this problem 
is to establish a very high preference for one of the items as baseline (see Parrish et al., 2018). However, 
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the downside of this approach is that strong preferences might be too hard to override regardless of other 
contextual features (e.g., decoy options). A thorough investigation of option (b) would thus require either 
a sample size that is difficult to obtain, or a totally different methodology. In that sense, one possible 
avenue for future research could be the use of touch-screen methods to establish food preferences. This 
way, subjects would be better able to evaluate the options presented. They would avoid prepotent 
responses, and hence reduce variation in choices (see Hopper et al., 2018, for an implementation of this 
methodology). Nonetheless, our findings might tip the balance in favor of considering that nonhuman 
primates are not sensitive to decoy when their preferences are at stake (option a). There are, indeed, 
reasons why the decoy effect would be a marker of human specific cognitive processes. 
One of the main explanations of the decoy effect in humans is that it is driven by a need for self-
justification while making choices (Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Shafir et al., 1993; Simonson, 1989). 
People would favor the item that dominates the decoy because it is easy to explain why this item is better. 
To our knowledge, no study has shown that apes justify their choices in front of others. For instance, 
when chimpanzees choose one partner over another to fulfil a collaborative goal, there are no behavioral 
signs of justifying a decision for an audience (Bullinger, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011; Melis, Hare, & 
Tomasello, 2006), and they do not attempt to manage their own reputations in view of others (Engelmann, 
Herrmann, & Tomasello, 2012) although in the wild great apes vocalize differently depending on the 
audience (see Clay & Zuberbühler, 2012; Slocombe & Zuberbühler, 2007).  
The decoy effect can also be explained as a consequence of loss aversion if the decoy changes the 
reference point of a prospect theory value function (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In our study, the 
presence of the banana decoy situates the reference point as having the decoy rather than as having 
nothing. Thus, having less of what the decoy provides induces an important loss of utility (i.e., the 
presence of the banana decoy increases the difference in utility between not having anything and having 
at least the decoy quantity of banana). Therefore, with the presence of the decoy, choosing grape implies 
forbearing the gain in utility of choosing an item that is at least as good as the banana decoy. Yet, this loss 
of utility is less likely to be compensated by the utility gained from taking the grape. The utility 
maximizer is therefore more likely to take the big slice of banana. In our study, however, apes still 
preferred the grape in most of trials. One possibility is that prospect theory does not clarify the underlying 
mechanisms that would drive individuals’ decisions in these contexts (i.e., under what conditions and how 
the presence of the decoy influence the reference point). It is possible that the reference point is changed 
only when subjects consider the reasons of their choices or are trying to justify their choices. If that is the 
case, then nonhumans are unlikely to modulate their reference point with the presence of decoys. 
Decoys can also help in the process of constructing a preference (Ariely & Wallsten, 1995). The 
presence of the decoy makes one dimension more salient than others. Explained as a consequence of 
processes for construal preferences, the decoy results from weighting the dimension made salient by the 
decoy more strongly than other dimensions (Ariely & Wallsten, 1995). This dimension is made salient 
because it easily allows selecting out one option: the decoy is strictly dominated on this dimension and 
should not be chosen. In our case, the banana decoy allows one to easily select out the bigger banana 
slice. Indeed, more than half of the apes in our sample increased their choices towards banana. However, 
this effect was not generalizable and thus we cannot conclude that this mechanism underlies decoy effects 
in apes. A plausible interpretation of the results is again that this preference construal is triggered by a 
search for justifications, which does not occur with great apes. 
However, in view of the evidence that nonhumans are sometimes sensitive to decoy stimuli 
(Parrish et al., 2015) in other kinds of tests, it is probable that several processes have decoy effects as 
consequences. Selective attention and visual perception are good candidate processes that could affect 
both humans and nonhumans. For instance, biases in visual perception could explain the perceptual decoy 
effect already documented in other primates (Parrish et al., 2015, but see Cohen & Santos, 2017). In our 
study, such a bias would have resulted in apes over-estimating the size of the banana slices or the grapes 
in the presence of their respective decoys. To better assess this possibility future studies could combine 
features from perceptual decoy tasks (e.g., Parrish et al., 2015) with natural food choices. For example, by 
presenting similar food items (e.g., pellets of different colors and tastes) varying in spatial configuration. 
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If the decoy effect were to appear in nonhumans tested in tasks other than perceptual ones, one should 
consider the possibility that this effect may not be caused by a single mechanism. Future studies should 
then be focused on targeting and specifying the mechanisms that are hypothesized to produce the effect. 
In summary, our results show that, with regards to the decoy effect, nonhuman apes might be 
more rational than humans, at least in the context of choosing among food items. Pointing out that some 
types of irrational choices are human specific provides very relevant information for understanding the 
cognitive basis of such choices. In the case of the decoy effect, two mechanisms hypothesized to be 
responsible for the effect are likely to be human specific. The first mechanism is a preference: the desire 
to feel justified. It leads to making ‘reason-based choice’ (Shafir et al., 1993). The second mechanism is 
the capacity to elaborate reasons for making one’s choice: it is sensitive to the presence of the decoy, 
which is used for elaborating reasons in favor of choosing the decoyed item. Ultimately, these findings 
(and previous ones: Agrillo, Parrish & Beran, 2014; Jensen, Call & Tomasello, 2007) serve to cast some 
doubts on the idea that human reasoning invariably issues nothing but rational choices. In fact, the decoy 
effect might be a signature of human reasoning together with the confirmation bias (Mercier & Sperber, 
2011). This account of at least one type of irrational choices goes against the idea that human cognition is 
less error prone than nonhuman cognition because it is supplemented by reason –an idea that remains 
popular among philosophers and behavioral economists (see Mercier & Sperber, 2017, for a review). 
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Appendix 
 
Reliability scores 
 
20% of the trials were coded by the second author, blinded to the baseline preferences of subjects. 
Inter-coder reliability was very high (Cohen’s K = .993, p < .001 – percentage of agreement was 99). 
 
Model analysis 
 
All model analyses were run using R statistics (version 3.1.1) and the package “lme4.” To rule 
out collinearity we checked the variance inflation factors (VIF) of the model. All VIF values were closer 
to 1 with the exception of Session which was closer to 2.  
Two generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) were used to investigate ape’s likelihood to 
choose B or G across different conditions. To obtain the P values for the individual fixed effects we 
conducted likelihood-ratio tests.  
 
Model 1: Banana model 
Model 1 investigated whether apes varied in their relative preference for B over other options 
across preference trials (BG), decoy trials (BGb) and low-value trials (BGC). If individuals were 
influenced by the presence of a decoy, we would expect a significant increase in their choices towards B 
during decoy trials. The model included 1008 trials. The full model included the test variable condition (3 
levels: preference trial, decoy trial and low-value trial. The control variables were trial, session, position 
of the baseline (either before or after test sessions) and specie as fixed effects; subject, center and left 
location of rewards as random effects and all possible random slopes. The comparison between the full 
and the null model was not significant (GLMM: χ2   = 2.6, df = 2, p = .27, N = 1,008). 
 
Model 2: Grape model 
Model 2 investigated whether apes varied in their relative preference for G over other options 
across preference trials (BG), decoy trials (BGg) and low-value trials (BGC). If individuals were 
influenced by the presence of a decoy, we would expect a significant increase in their choices towards G 
during decoy trials. The model included 1008 trials. The full model included the test variable condition (3 
levels: preference trial, decoy trial and low-value trial. The control variables were trial, session, position 
of the baseline (either before or after test sessions) and specie as fixed effects; subject, center and left 
location of rewards as random effects and all possible random slopes. The comparison between the full 
and the null model was not significant (GLMM: χ2  = 1.8, df = 2, p = .41, N = 1,008). 
 
Post-hoc model analysis 
 
Individuals with no preference (models 3 and 4) 
We inspected whether individuals with no clear preference for one specific item in both GB trials 
(selecting less than 10 times the same food choice) and in GBC trials (selecting less than 8 times the same 
food choice). For that purpose, we subset the datasets of models 1 and 2. 
 
Model 3: Banana model, no a priori preferences. 
The subset of model 1 included 684 trials from 19 individuals. The comparison between the full 
and the null model was not significant (GLMM: χ2   = 3.97, df = 2, p = .14, N = 684). 
 
Model 4: Grape model, no a priori preferences. 
Similarly, the subset of model 2 included 684 trials from 19 individuals. The comparison between 
the full and the null model was not significant (GLMM: χ2    = 3.71, df = 2, p = .16, N = 684). 
